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Abstract: Does commercialization mean mission drift? Christen (2001) argues
that commercialization, which is characterized by profitability, competition, and
regulation, does not have any effect on large differences in loan size between regulated and nonregulated MFIs. I used data from 28 Latin American MFIs to
conduct a multiple regression analysis to test for some of Christen’s conclusions,
as well as for other factors that, according to the literature on microfinance, may
affect loan size. The results of the regression indicate first that the type of institution, in terms of NGO versus financial institution, regardless of being regulated or not, has no effect on loan size. Second, the age of the institution
predicts loan size in a direction contrary to that suggested by Christen. Third,
competition turned out to be significant, in contradiction to Christen’s conclusion; it appears that more competition may lead to larger loan sizes and less
depth of outreach. Finally, the models confirm an old belief in microfinance:
there is a trade-off between depth and sustainability.

M

icrofinance institutions (MFIs) in Latin America are in
the midst of a commercialization process. International
organizations are encouraging this process and inviting
NGOs to join it, while the perception of MFIs as profitable businesses has increased (Christen, 2001). In an MFI inventory carried
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out by Christen in 2001, 205 MFIs were identified in Latin
America. Seventy-seven MFIs (37.6% of the total) were regulated
and accounted for 73.9% of a US$877 million portfolio. In general, this phenomenon has been called the commercialization of
microfinance. Commercialization is characterized by profitability,
competition, and regulation, but at the same time large differences
in loan size are observed between regulated and unregulated institutions (Christen, 2001). While unregulated MFIs recorded an
average outstanding loan size of US$322 in 1999, regulated institutions recorded US$803, which is 2.5 times larger. Assessed in
terms of relative wealth, the average outstanding loan size for
unregulated MFIs represented 24% of GNP per capita in 1999,
versus 49% for regulated MFIs.
Do these large differences in loan size mean mission drift?
Christen concludes that larger loans do not necessarily indicate
mission drift, and they could simply be the function of different
factors, such as choice of strategy, period of entry into the market,
or natural evolution of the target group. Consequently, in the first
place this paper discusses the points of view on impact assessment
and the use of loan size as a “proxy” measurement for poverty
level, and more important, it tests through a multiple regression
analysis for commercialization factors, as well as for those factors
that may also affect depth of outreach, in terms of loan size.
A preliminary sample of 30 Latin American MFIs was chosen
and finally 28 were included, based on the availability of operational and financial information. 1

Some Points of View on Impact Assesment
Microfinance scholars and practitioners are divided into two fields:
the welfarist and the institutionalist (Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Woller
& Woodworth, 2001). Morduch (2000) refers to these two positions as the microfinance schism. Each position differs in their views
on how microfinance services should be delivered (NGO versus
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commercial banks), on the technology they should use (financial
services, or “minimalist,” approach versus an “integrated” service
approach), and on how their performance should be assessed,
among other subjects.
On the last mentioned discrepancy, the welfarists believe that
MFI performance should be assessed in terms of the impact on the
welfare of the poor. In short, the welfarist approach is not only
concerned with the question of how poor the clients are, but
whether or not they are less poor after they borrow the money
(Cheston & Reed, 1999). Hence, their methods are aimed at determining whether the institutions are achieving their poverty reduction objective. On the other hand, the institutionalists believe that
performance should be assessed in terms of the institution’s success
in achieving self-sustainability and breadth of outreach. Breadth
and depth of outreach, although desirable for both institutionalists and welfarists, are perceived as contradictory objectives, thus
representing a trade-off for the institutions.
For the welfare-oriented practitioners, microfinance should
focus on reaching the poorest and help alleviate both material and
nonmaterial poverty, even with subsidized operations. On the
other hand, the institutionalists foster financial broadening, where
microfinance should focus on providing services to a large number
of poor people and reaching financial sustainability through more
efficient operations, market or higher-than-market interest rates,
and economies of scale (Bhatt & Tang, 2001).

Methods, Advantages, and Disadvantages of each Approach
The methods used by the welfarists assess the impact of the program on their clients by measuring changes in dependent variables,
such as the level of income, the level of production, sales, assets, or
the general well being of the client (Alfaro, 1999; Bhatt & Tang,
2001). The underlying assumption is the existence of a direct causal
relationship between the credit and the observed change in the dependent variable (Rhyne, 1994). The methodology to assess the impact
generally consists in collecting data ex-ante and ex-post the program intervention through direct interviews, and sometimes in
comparing the results against a control group.
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Eventually, the advantage of this approach is that it would
allow knowing whether the MFI has a positive impact in fighting
poverty. However, there are diverse criticisms to this approach.
Selection bias, lack of control groups, and inability to gather longitudinal data are common concerns (Bhatt & Tang, 2001).
Validity of the data also seems to be problematic, because such
studies “rely on the often unreliable memories of clients to determine their status before receiving a loan” (Cheston & Reed, 1999).
In addition, conducting these may take time and may be too
expensive to be absorbed by MFIs on a regular basis (Alfaro, 1999).
Additional fundamental problems still remain with this
methodology. First, credit is not an input for the production
process, but rather a financial instrument that increases purchasing
power. The fungibility of financial instruments implies that establishing a causal relationship between the credit and the dependent
variables would require controlling for the rest of the unit of analysis’s sources and uses of funds (Alfaro, 1999) and probably for
other factors different from money that may have an effect on the
dependent variables under study (i.e., the level of education of
the borrower). Second, the credit does not necessarily represent an
addition of 100% in purchasing power. In some cases there is
financial substitution and deviation (Von Pischke & Adams, 1980;
Alfaro, 1999). 2 In addition, even though an impact analysis
includes control groups, there is the problem of achieving equivalence between the control group and the group actually receiving
loans. As an efficient financial system or institution should discriminate between good and risky clients, the control groups
would be essentially different (Alfaro, 1999). Finally, looking for
equivalent control groups may also lead to other dilemmas.3
Contrary to the welfarist methods, the analysis of the institution’s performance carries lower costs and becomes more feasible to
assess continually in the long run. Basically, the institutionalist
approach employs two measurements of success: outreach and sustainability. Outreach is measured in two dimensions: depth, or
how poor the clients are; and breadth, or how many people the program is reaching. There is no causality chain analysis, and the
50
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indicators for depth of outreach are various measures of loan size.
For international comparisons, a ratio of loan size to per capita
GDP is also commonly used (Alfaro, 1999; Schreiner, 2001), and
breadth is usually measured as the number of clients or the types
of instruments offered (Bhatt & Tang, 2001).
The level of sustainability is measured through financial indicators such as the Subsidy Dependency Index (SDI), suggested by
Yaron in 1992, or through other similar indicators such as the
Explicit Subsidy Dependency Index (ESDI) or the Implicit Subsidy
Dependency Index (ISDI). Other more common measures such
as the Return over Equity (ROE) or the Return over Assets (ROA)
are also employed, but they do not account for subsidies when they
are recorded in the Profit and Loss statement. Contrary to the
welfarist approach, subsidies adjustments are necessary under this
approach, and they have to be reduced to a minimum level when a
MFI is looking for sustainability. In addition, Rhyne (1994) recommends the inclusion of one additional measure: the quality of the
service provided or quality of outreach. When an institution
records high repayment rates and high growth rates in terms of
clients, retains a large number of clients, and its clients are willing
to pay interest rates that allow for institutional self-sustainability,
then the services provided by the institution are considered of
“good quality” because they are “appreciated and relevant to its
clients” (Christen, Rhyne, Vogel, & McKean, 1995; Alfaro, 1999).
Due to the availability of data to carry out an analysis under
the institutionalist point of view, the methodology of this study
is framed within this approach. The shortcomings of the study will
be addressed when explaining each variable. Consequently,
the final results of this study are influenced and affected by these
limitations.

Models and Data
The goal of the study is to test for commercialization factors, as
well as for other factors that according to the literature may have
an impact on the depth of outreach. I use the Ordinary Least
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Square (OLS) regression method to find out which variables are
good predictors of loan size.

Dependent Variable: Depth of Outreach
Within the institutionalist approach, reaching the poor means
small loan sizes. The basic assumption is that the smaller the loan
size, the deeper the outreach, or the poorer the client. Thus, loan size
has been consistently used as a “proxy” for the level of poverty. In
his study, Christen uses two widely used measures of loan size:
average outstanding loan (AOL), obtained by dividing the outstanding loan portfolio by the number of active clients at the end
of the period of analysis; and the ratio of AOL to per capita GNP
(AOL/PCGNP), usually used in cross-comparative analyses. For
the initial sample of 30 Latin American MFIs, the AOL from the
NGOs was US$769, while financial institutions recorded
US$1,026 (1.33 times the NGO loan size). This result is much
lower than the ratio obtained by Christen (2.5 versus 1.33), which
may be the result of a selection bias problem, which is discussed in
detail in the section on data.
Schreiner (2001) critiques the use of both AOL and
AOL/PCGNP because they do not take into account other aspects
of loan size, 4 especially term to maturity. Schreiner argues that
AOL is imperfect, because it measures the resources held in the
term of the loan but does not consider the length of the term to
maturity. Since finance is the exchange of resources through time,
then loan size should account for it. Additionally, in many countries, especially in poor countries, per capita GNP can be distorted
by inequalities in income distribution. In countries with higher
inequalities, per capita GNP exceeds both median GNP and the
poverty-line income (Schreiner, 2001). Hence, AOL/PCGNP may
not be a useful measure for cross-comparative analysis. Schreiner
also criticizes the fact that the numerator and denominator pertain
to different time frames. The numerator (AOL) is a flow disbursed
in a specific moment, while the income (PCGNP) is generated in
an entire year. Within a year, there can be more than one disbursement. Schreiner suggests an alternative measure to adjust for time:
dollar-years of resources from loans over dollar-years of resources
52

Volume 7 Number 2

Commercializing Microfinance

from annual income, if it were all saved (denoted as $-years loan/$years income). Regrettably, there was not complete information on
the average disbursed loan for all the institutions under study;
thus, AOL substitutes this variable in Schreiner’s original formula:
Average outstanding loan
$-years loan/$-ye ars income =

12
2
Average term to matur ity 1
Per capita GDP / 2

I regress three measures of loan size—the two used by Christen
and the third suggested by Schreiner—on 7 independent variables,
but adjusting two of the measures of loan size containing income:
the AOL/PCGDP, and $-years loan/$-years income. In his critique
of the use of either per capita GNP or GDP, Schreiner suggests the
use of poverty-line income or median income but recognizes that
the first is measured in different ways across countries and that the
data for the second is hard to find. Therefore, I substitute per
capita GDP by per capita GDP of the 20% poorest when measuring both AOL/PCGDP and $-years loan/$-years income. Thus, the
new measures are AOL/PCGDP20% and $-years loan/$-years
income20%.
The average income of the poorest quintile could be a better
indicator than per capita GNP in order to compare outreach
among MFIs. This indicator is closer to the target group that MFIs
should be serving, and probably, there are no problems of significant inequality within the group. Although there are almost no
studies on income distribution aimed specifically at the poorest
quintile, 5 this study assumes that income distribution among the
lowest 20% is not as unequal as for the whole population. For
instance, when using AOL/PCGDP and the value of 1 as the upper
limit usually used as the indicator of depth of outreach (Alfaro,
1999), 24 out of 28 institutions would be classified as having a
“deep” outreach; that is, their AOLs represent less than the average
income. But when per capita GDP of the poorest 20% is used,
then only three institutions may claim that their AOLs were lower
than the income of the average person in the poorest quintile.
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This analysis suggests that most of the MFIs, whether they are
NGOs or banks, are not reaching the very poor when using these
adjusted measurements of loan size. Contrary to the expected
result, AOL/PCGDP and AOL/PCGDP20% are highly correlated
(0.924). A possible explanation is that the income share held by
the lowest 20% across the ten countries included in the analysis is
very similar (mean= 3.43%, standard deviation= 0.95). Similarly,
$-years loan/$-years income and $-years loan/$-year income20%
are also highly correlated (0.9608). In fact, and less expected,
AOL/PCGDP and $-years loan/$-year income also show a high
correlation (0.8374), and when adjusting by GDP of the lowest
20%, the correlation increases (0.9138), which suggests that, for
this specific analysis, accounting for time should not make much
difference.
Finally, the main limitation of loan size measures as a “proxy”
for poverty measurement emerges when the basic assumption—the
smaller the loan, the poorer the client—does not hold. This
assumption is based on another assumption: people with access to
traditional banking services do not find small loan sizes attractive,
since they have to wait months or even years to get large loans
(Woller & Woodworth, 2001). However, when access to credit is
restricted in an economy, there is a possibility that the well-off will
be willing to assume the high opportunity costs of borrowing small
amounts of money (Dunford, 2002; Hatch & Frederick, 1998).
Loan size is the only available information from most MFIs and is
used for the purpose of this analysis, despite the fact that some
scholars and practitioners do not recommend its use due to its
weakness in accurately determining the poverty level of clients and
beneficiaries (Hatch & Frederick, 1998).

Independent Variables
Type of Institution. In his paper, Christen (2001) compares the
loan size of regulated and nonregulated microfinance institutions
in Latin America and found substantial differences in loan size
between the two groups. Because regulated MFIs are associated
with increasing commercialization, Christen asked whether com54
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mercialization has drifted the MFIs’ mission of reaching the poorest of the poor. In his conclusion, Christen disregards mission drift
and suggests that large differences in loan size may be caused by
factors such as choice of strategy, maturity of portfolio, or client
group. Commercialization, characterized by profitability, competition, and regulation, has no effect.
To assess for the type-of-institution effect, I include a “dummy
variable” on whether the unit of analysis is a NGO (1) or not (0).
From the initial sample of 30 Latin American MFIs, there are 11
NGOs and 19 banks or nonbanking financial institutions, a group
that I called “financial institutions.” Regrettably, the sample is
mainly composed of regulated institutions—only three NGOs were
unregulated—and the simple dichotomy is not enough to characterize the variety of MFIs operating in Latin America. The results on
the adjusted loan sizes for each group are surprising. The ratio
AOL/PCGDP is larger for NGOs than for financial institutions
(0.80 versus 0.56), and the ratio AOL/PCGDP20% is again larger
for NGOs than for financial institutions (5.50 versus 2.90). A
similar outcome is also observed when using Schreiner’s loan size
measure. Given these large differences, and despite the fact that
MFIs are mostly regulated, it is still relevant to test for the type of
institution.
Age of the Institution. As mentioned in the previous section,
the differences in loan sizes found by Christen may be caused by
choice of strategy, maturity of portfolio, client group, or a combination of these causes. On choice of strategy, Christen argues that
“larger loan sizes could simply be the result of deliberate strategy
or choice . . . all the older, more established microfinance institutions (including in their previous incarnations as NGOs) in Latin
America started with an explicit objective to generate employment
in the urban microenterprise sector, so that their initial mission
was not reaching the poorest of the poor.” Christen mentions as a
choice of strategy the choice of operating as a regulated or nonregulated institution (instead of the NGO versus financial institution
dichotomy that is tested in this study), and in this case “large differences . . . may simply reflect the fact that the two groups started
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out to serve quite different populations.” On the maturity of portfolio, Christen argues that “[w]hat appears to be mission drift may
also be nothing more than the natural evolution of the average loan
balances of NGOs that transformed themselves into regulated
financial institutions . . . [t]hey all engaged in incremental lending,
in which loan balances start well below the client’s ability to pay
the installments and are subsequently increased through many
short-term loans.” Dunford (2002), Christen et al. (1995), and
Jansson and Taborga (2000) offer similar arguments.
Two of these three factors have a common element: the age of
the institution. Hence, years of operation are used to control for the
effect of time. In fact, Christen et al. (1995) consider that “in judging whether a given institution has achieved extensive outreach,
comparisons must be made with achievements of other institutions,
keeping in mind the program’s age.” In this case, the prediction
would be: the older the institution, the larger the loan size.
Sustainability. Throughout this document it has been stated
that financial sustainability and depth of outreach are perceived as
contradictory objectives. The basic assumption is that lending
small credits to the poor carries a higher cost of operation, hence
the prediction would be: the larger the loan size, the more profitable and sustainable the institution. On this issue, Schreiner
(2001) says, “greater loan size usually means more profitability for
the lender but less depth of outreach for the borrower.” He later
adds that “the drive for profits for the organization tends to
improve all aspects of outreach, except perhaps depth” (Schreiner,
2002). Woller and Woodworth argue that “the unsatisfied credit
demand among the disadvantaged non-poor, the not-so-poor, and
the poor, together with the high costs of targeting and reaching the
very poor, created an almost irresistible pull for MCIs 6 to move
upscale to wealthier and more profitable market segments.”
For this study it was not possible to find data on self-sufficiency
that excluded explicit or implicit subsidies, as Yaron suggests.
Hence, a measure of Return over Assets (ROA) without these
adjustments is used as the sustainability variable, instead of Return
over Equity (ROE), which may be distorted by the leverage or
56
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differences in the financing structures between NGOs, non-banking institutions, and banks.
Breadth of Outreach. For this study, breadth of outreach is the
number of active borrowers. As breadth and sustainability are positively related, then both are inversely related to depth, so the larger
the number of clients, the lower the depth or the larger the loan
size. However, in absolute terms, the picture can still be optimistic.
As Schreiner (2001) argues, wider breadth offsets depth, when an
institution reaches “as many of the very poor as poverty-oriented
organization with narrow breadth,” even when recording high
average loan balances.
Competition. According to Christen, “in regular markets, classic enterprises usually respond to competitive pressures by offering
new and better products at more competitive prices and by
improving productivity. As microfinance institutions increasingly
find themselves operating in markets where competition abounds,
their behavior more and more resembles that of classic enterprises.” Does competition increase the loan size? Christen argues
that commercialization, and therefore their characteristic components, does not have an effect on loan size. Hence, there should not
be any relationship between these two variables. I use the percentage of concentration of the four largest MFIs by country: the
higher the level of portfolio concentration, the lower the competitive pressures. Concentration is measured as the market share held
by the four largest MFIs in a country, and is calculated with data
from Christen (2001).
Gender. Depth of outreach has been also associated with gender distribution of the portfolio (Alfaro, 1999; Navajas, Schreiner,
Meyer, Gonzales-Vega, & Rodriguez-Mesa, 2000; Bhatt & Tang,
2001). Studies on women and development show that women are
relatively poorer than men; therefore, any institution engaged in
reaching mostly women should provide smaller loans. In this
study, gender is measured as the percentage of women clients in
the portfolio.
Credit Methodology. Two broad methodologies have been regularly used in microfinance: individual loans and group lending
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(solidarity groups). Using the latter methodology, each member
guarantees the repayment of every other member’s portion, which
creates social pressures within the group to avoid defaulting.
Christen found that the tendency of Latin American MFIs during
the last 10 years is toward an increasing number of individual
loans. What would be the effect of this tendency on loan size? For
Woller and Woodworth, “the process of loan-group formation also
can work to exclude the very poor. Lending groups typically
assume joint liability for loan repayment, which can create an
incentive to exclude the very poor, who are seen by other group
members as poorer credit risks.” This vision, however, contradicts
the generally accepted assumption that lending groups reach
poorer subjects of credit who do not have enough collaterals to
apply for an individual loan. An analysis of five Bolivian MFIs carried out by Navajas et al. (2000) found that “the group lenders in
Bolivia reached the poorest better than individual lenders.”
Besides, lending groups are mainly associated with microfinance
programs aimed at women, and as it has been argued above,
women are considered to be relatively poorer.
Usually, MFIs do not engage in only one credit methodology;
rather, they use both. Then, in order to assess the impact of credit
methodology on loan size, individual loans as the percentage of the
portfolio is used, with the prediction as follows: the larger the percentage, the lower the depth of outreach and the larger the loan size.

Sources of Data
Information on most of the variables is drawn from each MFI and
is mainly public. MFIs elaborate the primary data either for actual
variables used in this study or for their construction (e.g., loan size
measures and return over assets). Although sources of data were
various, the majority of the information for the years 1999, 2000,
and 2001 is available from the Microfinance Information Exchange
Program (Mix) web page (www.themix.org), a not-for-profit private
organization supported by CGAP-World Bank, the Citigroup
Foundation, and other private foundations. Specifically, the data
are available from those institutions with high or full disclosure of
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information—rated by the Mix as 4 and 5 diamonds; however, not
all the MFIs rated as 4 or 5 diamonds had complete data for the
study. In total, there were 36 MFIs rated lower than 4 and 5 diamonds, but only 28 MFIs had information on most of the variables
either from the Mix Market or from other sources. To fill the gaps
of information, I used other sources, such as the web sites of
Accion International (www.accion.org), MFIs, and banking regulatory agencies, as well as MFIs’ annual reports and audited financial
statements. Most of the annual reports and financial statements
were also available through the Mix Market in the form of pdf documents. Because the data are presented or have been translated
from local currencies into US$ and contained in a period of four
years, I did not adjust the financial statements by inflation nor
restate them in a year-base currency, assuming that the statistical
effect would be negligible.
Missing values on gender and credit methodology were substituted in both cases by the mean obtained from the rest of the
sample. Two additional institutions were added to the original 28
MFIs; one from a case study written by the author (Financiera
Calpia, El Salvador), and the other from information released by a
banking regulatory agency (Bangente, Venezuela). The only data
not generated by the MFIs were GDP, population, income share
held by the lowest 20% of the population, and the average and
year-end exchange rate. The source of this information was the
International Finance Statistics (CD-ROM) from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Some comments on the data and the sample are relevant at this
point. First, as the author constructed, fully or partially, some of
the variables, there is the possibility of error. Second, although the
sample represents only the 13.6% of the MFIs inventoried by
Christen in 2001, there could be a selection bias problem because
the sample was not randomly selected. As this is the only public
information available on Latin American MFIs for the purpose of
this study, and most of the information was drawn from the Mix
Market database, it is possible that this sample is substantially different from the actual MFI population. The Mix Market promotes
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transparency among MFIs worldwide, and the fact that only 3 out
of 11 Latin American NGOs from this database are unregulated
could be an indicator that most of the institutions reporting to the
Mix Market are following a more commercial-oriented strategy
than the actual population of MFIs as a whole. In fact, two of the
three unregulated NGOs operate in Nicaragua, where, according
to Christen, “commercialization has not entailed the transformation of financial NGOs into licensed banking intermediaries . . .
[s]purred by direct competition, commercialization is beginning
even though traditional profit-seeking entrepreneurs, such as commercial banks, have not yet entered the market.” For these reasons,
it is possible that the results from this study cannot be generalized
to the entire population of Latin American MFIs and reflects more
accurately the reality of commercial MFIs in the region.

Results
OLS was conducted to determine which of the seven variables are
predictors of loan size. For this study, three measures of loan size
were used, resulting in three sets of models. Data screening allowed
the identification of outliers, and two institutions were eliminated
in each of the three sets: Compartamos and FMDR, both from
Mexico. Compartamos is a regulated nonbanking institution, while
FMDR is an unregulated NGO. Therefore, the final database
ended up with a total of 28 observations, where only two were
unregulated NGOs—from Nicaragua—and eight were regulated
NGOs.

Model Containing AOL
The regression results for the model containing AOL (US$ per
loan) as the dependent variable and seven independent variables do
not indicate that the model significantly predicts loan size, R2
=0.185, R2adj= -0.100, F (7,20) = 0.649, p[0.712. This model
accounted for only 18.5% (zero when adjusting for degrees of freedom) of the variance in loan size, and none of the coefficients
proved to be significant, suggesting that these independent variables are not useful in predicting loan size in terms of absolute
value—US$ per loan.
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Table 1. Database of Selected Latin American MFIs
Institution

Country

Year of
Data

AOL
(US$)

AOL/
PCGDP
20%

$-years
loan/ $-years
income 20%

1

ACODEP

Nicaragua

1999

291.00

5.652

24.452

2

ACTUAR-Tolima

Columbia

2000

340.17

1.180

3.357

3 ACTUAR-Antioquia

Columbia

2001

608.76

2.108

5.727

4

ADMIC

Mexico

2000 1,588.70

1.548

3.286

5

BancoSol

Bolivia

2000 1,279.70

6.484

12.238

6

Crear-Tanca

Peru

2000 1,433.00

3.126

13.227

7

Eco Futuro

Bolivia

2000

655.33

3.320

12.826

8

EDYFICAR

Peru

2000

599.49

1.308

5.207

9

FADES

Bolivia

2000

529.13

2.681

5.984

10

FAMA

Nicaragua

2000

433.63

7.980

37.131

11

Finamerica

Columbia

2000 1,032.78

3.583

10.081

12

FINCOMUN

Mexico

2000

993.62

0.968

6.690

13 Génesis Empreserial

Guatemala

2000

442.33

1.396

4.066

14

PRODEM

Bolivia

2000

782.18

3.963

11.097

15

Visión de Finanzas

Paraguay

2000

659.47

5.072

18.876

16

WWB-Medellín

Columbia

2000

325.48

1.129

4.438

ADOPEM Dominican Rep

1999

17

386.22

0.719

2.081

Bolivia

1999 2,945.07

14.609

24.029

19

Banco ADEMI Dominican Rep

2000 3,088.14

5.155

11.429

20

Caja los Andes

Bolivia

1999

919.33

4.560

12.043

21

CMAC-Arequipa

eru

2001 1,001.38

2.221

7.650

22

CMAC-Maynas

Peru

2000

314.93

0.687

3.000

23

FIE

Bolivia

2000

962.51

4.877

10.876

24

FINDE

Nicaragua

1999 1,136.15

22.065

91.500

25

MiBanco

Peru

2000

636.35

1.388

2.094

26

PROEMPRESA

Peru

2000 1,160.31

2.531

12.469

27

Financiera Calpia

El Salvador

2000

802.68

2.311

6.619

28

Bangente

Venezuela

2001 1,412.76

1.832

10.916

18

AgroCapital

Table 1. Database of Selected Latin American MFIs (continued)
Institution
ACODEP

Type Age Sustainability
(ROA)
1 10
10.67%

Breadth of
Outreach
15,073

Gender

Credit
Level of
Methodology Competition
62.0%
98.75%
0.632

ACTUAR-Tolima

1

14

-14.68%

3,444

52.7%

69.00%

0.757

ACTUAR-Antioquia

1

18

2.98%

8,913

57.5%

100.00%

0.757

ADMIC

0

20

-0.88%

4,424

90.0%

100.00%

0.793

BancoSol

0

14

0.89%

60,976

72.0%

65.00%

0.587

Crear-Tanca

0

8

4.51%

2,637

40.0%

95.00%

0.935

Eco Futuro

0

1

-12.00%

17,400

52.0%

42.00%

0.587

EDYFICAR

0

3

2.74%

16,451

45.0%

95.00%

0.935

FADES

1

14

0.08%

22,582

35.0%

80.45%

0.587

FAMA

1

9

5.34%

14,301

66.0%

100.00%

0.632

Finamerica

0

7

-2.87%

16,049

48.0%

44.50%

0.757

FINCOMUN

0

6

-1.25%

3,300

46.0%

100.00%

0.793

Génesis Empreserial

1

12

1.41%

25,217

58.0%

77.90%

0.908

PRODEM

0

14

0.29%

30,227

49.0%

34.43%

0.587

Visión de Finanzas

0

8

2.89%

34,531

57.5%

100.00%

0.842

WWB-Medellín

1

15

8.52%

8,883

5803%

100.00%

0.757

ADOPEM

1

17

10.70%

17,847

88.0%

39.00%

1.000

AgroCapital

1

7

0.04%

4,524

57.5%

100.00%

0.587

Banco ADEMI

0

17

9.73%

16,408

36.0%

100.00%

1.000

Caja los Andes

0

4

-15.74%

36,814

54.0%

100.00%

0.587

CMAC-Arequipa

0

15

4.83%

49,246

57.5%

100.00%

0.935

CMAC-Maynas

0

13

4.33%

14,053

57.5%

100.00%

0.935

FIE

0

15

1.59%

23,402

53.8%

100.00%

0.587

FINDE

1

6

13.02%

2,837

62.0%

100.00%

0.632

MiBanco

0

8

3.39%

58,088

59.0%

80.45%

0.935

PROEMPRESA

0

14

2.80%

3,559

44.0%

92.00%

0.935

Financiera Calpia

0

12

4.29%

37,621

60.6%

100.00%

0.867

Bangente

0

2

-3.93%

5,221

49.0%

100.00%

1.000
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Table 2. Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of
Average Outstanding Loan (AOL) on Selected
Independent Variables
Independent Variable
Type of institution (NGO – Financial Inst.)

Model
-545.863
(-1.526)

Age of the institution (years)

15.363
(0.503)

Sustainability (ROA)

12.580
(0.518)

Breadth of outreach (# clients)

-0.0102
(-1.072)

Competition (concentration)

-6.103
(-0.587)

Gender (% women as clients)

-5.901
(-0.485)

Credit methodology (% of individual loans)
Constant
R2
Adjusted R2
F-value (model)
Number of MFIs

5.213
(0.760)
1,524.557
(1.196)
0.185
-0.100
0.649
(7, 20)
28

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values, except for F-value (degrees of freedom).
* p [ 0.05
** p [ 0.01
*** p [ 0.001

Models Containing AOL/PCGDP20%
In these models, AOL/PCGDP20% is the dependent variable and
the regression results indicate that the full model significantly predicts loan size, R2 =0.57, R2adj= 0.42, F(7,20) = 3.790, p[0.01.
This model accounts for 42% of the variance in loan size adjusted
for degrees of freedom, and three coefficients (age, sustainability,
and competition) are significantly different from zero, suggesting
that they do have an effect on loan size. The reduced model is a
more parsimonious one: only the three significant independent
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variables were included, and although R2 decreased, adjusted R2
increased.

Table 3. Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of the
Ratio Average Outstanding Loan (AOL) to Per Capita
GDP of the Lowest 20% on Selected Independent
Variables.
Independent Variable

Model 1 (full)

Model 2 (reduced)

Type of institution (NGO – Financial Inst.)

0.431
(0.251)

_____

Age of the institution (years)

-0.347*
(-2.360)

-0.334*
(-2.520)

Sustainability (ROA)

0.332**
(2.837)

0.374**
(3.663)

Breadth of outreach (# clients)

-0.000029
(-0.637)

_____

Competition (concentration)

-0.174**
(-3.490)

-0.178***
(-4.123)

Gender (% women as clients)

0.035
(0.601)

_____

Credit methodology (% of individual loans)

0.027
(0.803)

_____

Constant

17.094*
(2.789)

20.977***
(5.778)

R2
Adjusted R2
F-value (model)

0.57
0.42
3.790**
(7, 20)

0.531
0.472
9.053***
(3, 24)

Number of MFIs

28

28

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values, except for F-value (degrees of freedom).
* p [ 0.05
** p [ 0.01
*** p [ 0.001

Models Containing $-years loan/income 20%
The last set of models include $-years loan/income of the lowest
20% as the dependent variable. For this case, the regression results
indicate that the full model significantly predicts loan size, R2
=0.593, R2adj= 0.451, F(7,20) = 4.164, p[0.01. This model
64
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accounts for 0.451% of the variance in loan size corrected for
degrees of freedom, and again the same three coefficients from the
model containing AOL/PCGDP20% (age, sustainability, and competition) are significantly different from zero, suggesting that they
do have an effect on loan size. In a way similar to the previous
model, the three significant independent variables were included in
a separate model (2). For the reduced model, although R2
decreased, adjusted R2 increased, as it was observed previously.
Interestingly, adjusted R2 are very similar for both sets of models
(0.472 versus 0.471).

Table 4. Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of the
ratio $-years of resources from loan to $-year of resources
from per capita GDP of the lowest 20% on Selected
Independent Variables.
Independent Variable

Model 1 (full)

Model 2 (reduced)

Type of institution (NGO – Financial Inst.)

1.349
(0.213)

_____

Age of the institution (years)

-1.623**
(-3.005)

-1.561**
(-3.115)

Sustainability (ROA)

1.433**
(3.334)

1.587***
(4.112)

Breadth of outreach (# clients)

0.000195
(-1.154)

_____

Competition (concentration)

-0.539**
(-2.933)

-0.550**
(-3.372)

Gender (% women as clients)

0.173
(0.804)

_____

Credit methodology (% of individual loans)

0.081
(0.668)

_____

Constant

57.401*
(2.548)

70.628***
(5.143)

R2
Adjusted R2
F-value (model)

0.593
0.451
4.164**
(7, 20)

0.530
0.471
9.016***
(3, 24)

Number of MFIs

28

28

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values, except for F-value (degrees of freedom).
* p [ 0.05
** p [ 0.01
*** p [ 0.001
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Conclusions
I assessed the effects of commercialization factors and other variables that, according to the literature on microfinance, may also
affect loan size. Using data from diverse sources, the analysis on the
first measure of loan size—average outstanding loan in US$—led
to a nonsignificant model: independent variables do not explain
any variance in loan size. Because this measure of loan size has been
widely criticized, additional models with different measures of loan
sizes were used.
Using the ratio of average outstanding loan to per capita GDP
of the lowest 20%, the main finding was that the type of institution has no significant effect on loan size. Using a modified ratio
derived from Schreiner’s formula—dollar-years from borrowed
resources to dollar-years from per capita income of the lowest
20%—the results are similar. The same independent variables were
the significant ones in both sets of models: age of the institution,
sustainability, and the level of competition. In addition, the type of
institution, breadth of outreach, gender, and credit methodology
turned out to be not significant as well.
Additional research could assess other possible predictors of
loan size, such as urban/rural scope (Thys, 2000), deposit deepening, importance of nonfinancial products, or business strategies for
microfinance operations (i.e., downscaling, upscaling, etc.).
Further studies may also include measures of average disbursed
loan as the dependant variable. In this study, it was not possible to
find appropriate information to test for these factors. There is also
the question of whether this analysis should follow a more dynamic
approach, in which changes in the unit of analysis should be
assessed over time (3 or 5 years), as Schreiner suggests (2001, pp.
22). This type of analysis could be more useful in understanding
MFIs’ operations, but longitudinal information for five years is
even harder to gather.
Conservatively, these results should not be generalized to the
entire Latin American MFI population. As I argued before, most of
the information came from MFIs that seem to be engaged in a
more commercial approach: they are reporting to the Mix Market,
66
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an institution that is looking for and encouraging more disclosure
of information and transparency. Part of its purpose is for investors
to make the better investment decisions based on available information, and for MFIs to obtain needed resources for growth.
Therefore, it could be the case that the entire population of MFIs
in Latin America is different from this sample, which in fact may
resemble instead the population of commercial MFIs.
The results deserve some comments, however. First, the sign of
the coefficient for the age of the institution suggests a negative
relationship: the older the institution, the lower the loan size; this
finding contradicts two of Christen’s arguments: the target group
of pioneering NGOs was not the poorest of the poor, but a higher
income group, and their engagement in incremental lending.
Statistically, the process seems to be the other way around: newer participants may be serving higher income clients than older
participants.
Second, the sign of the coefficient for the level of competition
indicates that the higher the concentration—or the lower the competition—the lower the loan size. If this variable accurately predicts loan size, then more competition in a microfinance market
will also result in larger loan sizes, suggesting that institutions will
probably search for more profitable clients.
Finally, the sign of the coefficient for sustainability (ROA)
confirms an old belief in microfinance: there is a trade-off between
profitability and depth of outreach.

Notes
1. These institutions are ACODEP (Nicaragua), ACTUAR-Tolima (Colombia),
ACTUAR-Antioquia (Colombia), ADMIC (Mexico), BancoSol (Bolivia), CrearTacna (Peru), Eco Futuro (Bolivia), EDYFICAR (Peru), FADES (Bolivia), FAMA
(Nicaragua), Finamerica (Colombia), FINCOMUN (Mexico), Génesis Empreserial
(Guatemala), PRODEM (Bolivia), Visión de Finanzas (Paraguay), WWB-Medellín
(Colombia), ADOPEM (Dominican Republic), AgroCapital (Bolivia), Banco ADEMI
(Dominican Republic), Caja los Andes (Bolivia), CMAC-Arequipa (Peru), CMACMaynas (Peru), FIE (Bolivia), FINDE (Nicaragua), MiBanco (Peru), PROEMPRESA
(Peru), Financiera Calpia (El Salvador), and Bangente (Venezuela).
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2. For example, financial substitution occurs when a borrower receives a loan to
buy two bags of fertilizer, but without the loan, the borrower would have bought one
bag anyway. In this case, the loan resulted in 50% of addition and 50% of financial
substitution (Adams et al., 1990; Alfaro 1999).
3. For instance, when two prospective clients are good credit subjects, then why,
or under which criteria, should the institution discriminate against one of them?
4. In his article “Seven Aspects of Loan Size,” Schreiner (2001) argues that loan
size depends on how the borrowers give more importance to some of the seven aspects
than others. The seven aspects are: term to maturity, dollars disbursed, average balance, dollars per installment, time between installments, number of installments, and
dollar-years of borrowed resources.
5. Most of the studies on income distribution are developed at the total population level.
6. MCI stands for Microcredit Institution.
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